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Abstract
Legislation, in the form of presumed consent, has been argued to boost organ donation but most evidence disregards the 
practice of seeking relative’s consent, which can either ‘veto’ donation decisions, or ‘legitimize them’, by removing any 
possible conflict with the donor’s family. We study the effect of presumed consent alongside family consent on individu-
als’ willingness to donate (WTD) one’s own and relatives’ organs, and on actual organ donation behaviours. Using data 
from 28 European countries for the period 2002–2010, we found that presumed consent (PC) policies are associated with 
increased willingness to donate organs, but this effect was attenuated once internal family discussions on organ donation 
were controlled for. Our findings indicate that relative’s consent acts as a veto of donation intentions and attenuates the effect 
of regulation on actual donations. More specifically, PC increases WTD one’s own and relatives’ organs in countries where 
no family consent is required. Consistently, we find that family consent attenuates the influence of regulatory environment 
on actual donations. The effect is driven by the influence of family discussions which increased WTD, and in combination 
with presumed consent translated into higher organ donation rates.
Keywords Organ donation · Relative consent · Family veto · European countries · Presumed consent
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Introduction
Organ supply shortages against increasing demand have 
resulted in long transplantation waiting lists in the United 
States (US) and Europe. Evidence shows that in the US, 
only 42% of eligible organ donors end up actually donating 
[1]. Similarly, in the European Union (EU), nearly 50,000 
patients were waiting for a kidney transplant and over 63,000 
were waiting for an organ by the end of 2013. [2] Estimates 
are that about 4100 patients died while on waiting lists in 
the EU in 2013. [2] Hence, there is wide scope and need for 
increasing donation rates.
Although the legislative environment and in particular 
the effectiveness of presumed consent legislation play a role 
to incentivize organ donation [3–6], donation decisions are 
either expressed in individuals’ wills prior to death or—in 
most cases—posthumously by family members. To date, we 
know little about the influences of relatives’ decisions about 
their loved ones’ organs on actual donation rates. One of the 
major challenges to increasing organ donation rates is that 
of relatives’ vetoes, often irrespective of the donor decision 
[7–9]. Unless donation has been discussed with the deceased 
or has been written in an advanced directive or living will, 
family members might make choices based on their own 
opinions, or delay the process, making donation unfeasible. 
Hence, the family plays a key role in determining the final 
donation decision [10] and family refusal can impede organ 
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donation [11, 12]. Approximately half of families in the US 
and 43% in the UK object to donation in comparison to 20% 
in Spain, a country often touted as having relatively high 
organ donation rates [13–15].
Previous research using procurement data across 22 coun-
tries worldwide indicates that presumed consent policy has 
an impact on donation rates [3]. It has been found to increase 
organ donations and willingness to donate organs in Europe 
[5, 6, 16]. A number of other studies have examined the 
empirical determinants of effective organ procurement rates 
and the role of legislation [17–19]. However, a systematic 
review found that there is more to cross-country differences 
in donation than the presence of presumed consent legis-
lation [20]. Recent evidence from the introduction of pre-
sumed consent in Wales shows a reduction in the number 
of organ donors [21]. For example, Kessler and Roth [22] 
document that in making next-of kin decisions, relatives are 
more likely to support the donation of a relative’s organ if 
the deceased did not ‘opt in’ rather than when explicitly 
opted out. Therefore, it remains important to disentangle the 
effect of family consent from that of legislative environment. 
To understand the role of family consent to a relative’s dona-
tion, it is important to explore the issue of family discussions 
in organ donation.
This paper examines whether organ donation legisla-
tion influences both the individual and relatives’ donation 
attitudes by vetoing (or delaying) a potentially viable and 
even intended donation. Prior studies have disregarded this 
effect, potentially overestimating the positive impact of pre-
sumed consent legislation in the presence of family vetoes 
and limited discussion around donations to make informed 
decisions. The analysis of attitudes is particularly important 
in the context of organ donation decisions. Indeed, decisions 
about organ donation often do not allow much time to make 
an informed decision, hence pre-approved attitudes might 
make a difference. In these circumstances, attitudes can be 
a better proxy of future donations. That said, whether atti-
tudes explain actual donation, and implicitly whether family 
vetoes donation decisions might depend on the regulatory 
environment. More specifically, one would expect individual 
attitudes to donating a relative’s organs to be more important 
in countries with larger reliance on family consent.
We attempt to answer two questions. First, does the pres-
ence of family consent reduce organ donation? Second, 
does family consent reduce donations more in opt-out rather 
than in opt-in policy settings? Countries select into opt-in 
or opt-out policy environments. In the absence of written 
consent (opt-in), family typically gets involved by default 
in the organ donation decision in two possible ways. First, 
if the family member has made no choice and families are 
allowed to veto opt-in decisions. Second, in some countries 
such as Germany, family can veto the opt-in decision if they 
provide good arguments for a change in the person’s mind 
after the consent statement. Hence, family consent might be 
an explanation as to why opt-in countries might well observe 
an attenuated effect on donations, which makes them similar 
to opt-out countries. More generally, the presence of family 
vetoes depends on individual family cultural characteristics 
alongside country specific influences such information sys-
tem characteristics, hospital processes and family support 
for the deceased.
Our study focuses on European data. European countries 
exhibit very significant heterogeneity in organ donation 
legislation [23], making them specifically suitable for the 
purposes of our study. In the EU, there are two types of 
institutional settings for organ donation: informed consent 
(opt-in) or presumed consent (opt-out). In countries with 
informed consent or ‘opt-in’ legislation, such as the UK, 
Germany, and Sweden, an individual or his/her family must 
give explicit permission for organ removal. Presumed con-
sent countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Austria, assume 
universal consent without explicit registration otherwise.
We draw upon a large number of attitudinal observations 
from three waves of Eurobarometer surveys (2002, 2006, 
2009), which are representative data from the European 
Union and extend findings from other studies [4–6]. In total, 
these provide 51,313 observations. We study the effect of 
legislative environment alongside family consent as well as 
known factors from the literature predicting organ donation 
rates and willingness to donate in addition to country and 
time fixed effects. The inclusion of time and country-specific 
effects are our preferred specification as they net out the 
effect of country specific features (such as culture), or time 
invariant characteristics (such as the effect of events that are 
specific to a year). In addition, our specification includes a 
number of important controls for alternative explanations for 
organ donation such as education level, occupation, gender 
and age as well as health expenditure, overall country wealth 
and overall population education levels.
Our findings indicate that family consent reduced WTD 
and attenuated the effect of actual donations. The next sec-
tion describes the data and methods. Section three con-
tains the results and additional analyses and a final section 
concludes.
Data
Willingness to donate (WTD) data
We use Eurobarometer surveys 58.2, 66.2 and 72.3 from 
2002, 2006 and 2009, respectively, to create a pooled 
cross-sectional database of 51,313 individual responses 
(descriptive statistics for the pooled sample are provided in 
Table 1). The Eurobarometer surveys are Europe-wide sur-
veys with a representative national sample from each EU 
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country and allow us to form a set of repeated cross sec-
tions with observations from 15 countries in 2002 and 28 
countries in 2006 and 2009 (current EU countries plus Tur-
key and United Kingdom, and excluding Malta for which 
no relevant data were available). Eurobarometer surveys 
are conducted on a multi-stage random sampling basis. 
Primary sampling units at the national population level 
were taken on a random basis according to each country’s 
distribution of metropolitan, urban and rural residents. 
In the second stage, a cluster of addresses was randomly 
selected from each primary sampling unit. Addresses were 
chosen systematically using standard random route pro-
cedures, beginning with an initial address selected at ran-
dom. Respondents within each household were selected at 
random for face-to-face interviews. The advantage of the 
procedure employed was that the response rate effectively 
becomes 100% because of random sample cluster replace-
ment strategies such that when one respondent opts out, 
another with similar characteristics is interviewed. Caveats 
to the survey include sampling procedure methods and dif-
ficulties associated with measuring income and education 
among EU member states [27–29].
Respondents were asked about their WTD their own 
organs as well as those of a relative, whether they have 
discussed organ donation with their family, and relevant 
socio-demographic variables. Population size weights were 
applied to all Eurobarometer data in proportion to the total 
population of countries included in the sample.
Actual donation behaviour
We exploit a number of additional data sources to supple-
ment our analysis of the Eurobarometer datasets. Given 
that actual donation can only be measured at the aggregate 
level, we combine aggregate country-level donation rates 
with aggregated data on attitudes towards organ donation 
from the Eurobarometer surveys. Actual deceased organ 
donation rates for each country for years 2001–2010 were 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics of Eurobarometer sample
Variable 2002 2006 2009 Pooled sample
Sample size, N 10,675 20,194 20,444 51,313
Willingess to donate own organs, % (SE) 73.5 (0.6) 67.3 (0.5) 64.5 (0.5) 67.4 (0.3)
Willingness to donate family member’s organs, % (SE) 69.5 (0.7) 68.5 (0.5) 65.2 (0.5) 67.3 (0.3)
Have discussed organ donation in family, % (SE) 53.2 (0.7) 44.5 (0.6) 42.3 (0.5) 45.4 (0.3)
Living in a country with presumed consent legislation, % (SE) 57.3 (0.7) 61.8 (0.6) 66.3 (0.5) 62.8 (0.3)
Living in a country with routine family consent, % (SE) 72.3 (0.6) 69.4 (0.5) 73.9 (0.5) 71.8 (0.3)
Married or living together, % (SE) 58.9 (0.7) 61.1 (0.6) 63.6 (0.5) 61.6 (0.4)
Female, % (SE) 50.9 (0.7) 50.9 (0.6) 50.5 (0.5) 50.6 (0.3)
Age, % (SE)
 15–24 years 16.5 (0.6) 15.1 (0.4) 16.2 (0.4) 15.8 (0.3)
 25–44 years 36.5 (0.7) 35.7 (0.6) 34.9 (0.5) 35.5 (0.3)
 45–64 years 28.8 (0.6) 29.9 (0.5) 30.2 (0.5) 29.8 (0.3)
 65 + years 18.2 (0.6) 19.3 (0.4) 18.6 (0.4) 18.8 (0.3)
Education (age when stopped full-time education), % (SE)
  < 16 years 26.2 (0.6) 24.4 (0.5) 26.8 (0.5) 25.7 (0.3)
 16–19 years 40.7 (0.7) 41.6 (0.6) 40.7 (0.5) 41.0 (0.3)
 20 + years 22.4 (0.6) 24.4 (0.5) 23.7 (0.5) 23.7 (0.3)
 Still studying 10.7 (0.5) 9.6 (0.3) 8.8 (0.3) 9.5 (0.2)
Urban residency, % (SE) 38.6 (0.7) 24.9 (0.5) 28.1 (0.5) 29.0 (0.3)
Landline phone ownership, % (SE) 84.3 (0.5) 75.9 (0.5) 69.7 (0.5) 75.0 (0.3)
Mobile phone ownership, % (SE) 73.3 (0.6) 80.6 (0.4) 85.6 (0.4) 81.2 (0.3)
Occupation, % (SE)
 Unemployed 5.4 (0.3) 5.8 (0.3) 6.7 (0.3) 6.1 (0.2)
 Self employed 8.4 (0.4) 7.9 (0.3) 7.7 (0.3) 7.9 (0.2)
 White collar worker 20.8 (0.6) 22.6 (0.5) 20.1 (0.4) 21.2 (0.3)
 Manual worker 21.7 (0.6) 20.4 (0.5) 21.5 (0.5) 21.1 (0.3)
 House person 10.9 (0.4) 8.7 (0.3) 11.8 (0.4) 10.4 (0.2)
 Retired 22.6 (0.6) 25.0 (0.5) 23.5 (0.4) 23.9 (0.3)
 Student 10.2 (0.5) 9.6 (0.3) 8.7 (0.3) 9.3 (0.2)
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assembled primarily from the International Registry on 
Organ Donation and Transplantation [24]. Missing data 
were supplemented with data from the Global Observatory 
on Donation and Transplantation. [25] We included the 
number of deaths from motor vehicle accidents and cer-
ebrovascular causes per 100,000 population [30] and gross 
domestic product (GDP) per  capita. [31] We also included 
the percentage of residents with tertiary education [32] 
and a dummy for countries that are predominantly Catholic 
[33]. Information on the type of organ donation legisla-
tion and protocols of seeking family approval came from 
a variety of sources [3, 6, 20, 34–36].
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the aggregate 
level. Overall, we have a three times larger sample of 
countries that use presumed consent (PC) than informed 
consent. The latter were similar in term of income per 
capita but informed consent countries exhibited higher per 
capita health expenditure. Cadaveric organ donation rates 
per million population were higher in presumed consent 
countries. More countries with presumed consent legis-
lation were predominantly Catholic. Countries adopting 
an informed consent policy had higher GDP per capita 
and health expenditure per capita than countries with 
presumed consent policies. There was no statistically sig-
nificant difference between the two sets of countries for 
the number of deaths from motor vehicle accidents and 
cerebrovascular causes.
Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy rests on running two sets of empirical 
specifications to study the effect of family consent alongside 
of legislative environment. The first refers to examining at 
the individual level whether individuals’ WTD their own or 
family members’ organs depend on presumed consent and 
family consent. This will allow us to understand whether 
legislation is associated with differences in behaviours. 
The second set of models comes from an aggregate level 
specification using actual country level donation rates as 
the dependent variable. At both the individual and aggregate 
levels, several models are specified, going from a “naïve” 
specification that focuses only on the role of organ donation 
policies to comprehensive, and preferred specifications tak-
ing into account how attitudes towards organ donation are 
discussed within the family.
Individual‑level specifications
We study the association between legislation and individual-
level WTD using the standard dependent variables of WTD 
one’s own organs or WTD those of a relative. Previous stud-
ies interpreted WTD as an expression of the intent to pursue 
a behaviour and identified some dimensions of what actually 
happens during organ donation decisions. This model would 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics of 28 countries in the sample
Variable Presumed consent Informed consent p value 
(two-sample 
t test)
N 21 7
Cadaveric organ donation rate, per million population 
(SD)
16.2 (8.1) 12.1 (5.2) < 0.0001
Health expenditure per capita, constant (2005) US$ 
(SD)
2,033 (1,698) 2,930 (1,906) 0.0003
GDP per capita, constant (2005) US$ (SD) 24,996 (13,818) 28,761 (11,599) 0.0412
Deaths from motor vehicle accidents, per 100,000 
population (SD)
16.7 (21.1) 14.7 (24.1) 0.5012
Cerebrovascular deaths, per 100,000 population (SD) 77.2 (50.1) 74.5 (58.7) 0.7133
Catholic countries, N (%, SD) 12 (57.1%, 49.6) 2 (28.6%, 45.5) < 0.0001
Common law countries, N (%, SD) 1 (4.8%, 21.3) 2 (28.6%, 45.5) < 0.0001
Married or living with partner, % (SD) 62.1 (4.7) 59.6 (5.1) 0.0003
Tertiary education attainment among 30–34 years 
olds, % (SD)
27.2 (10.6) 32.0 (10.2) 0.0012
Population 0–14 years, % (SD) 16.1 (1.9) 17.5 (2.1) < 0.0001
Population 65 + years, % (SD) 15.9 (2.1) 15.1 (2.3) 0.0076
Informed consent Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, United Kingdom
Presumed consent without routine family consent Austria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Sweden
Presumed and routine family consent Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey
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implicitly incorporate specific information such as whether 
a family discussion had taken place regarding wishes of a 
family member. However, here, we relax such an assump-
tion by first investigating individuals’ donation attitudes (as 
a proxy for intended behaviours), followed by an analysis of 
actual donation rates. In addition to the legislative environ-
ment, individuals can express favour towards organ donation 
as an abstract concept but they may not be reflecting how 
they feel about actual donation for themselves or a family 
member and instead are thinking about it in the context of 
society in general. Such ambivalence might explain some 
disconnect between WTD and actual donation behaviours 
when such decisions take place.
Our key variables of interest are organ donation legisla-
tion alongside family consent, which varies at the country 
level. Even though no major legislative changes regarding 
organ donation occurred in individual countries over the 
period where Eurobarometer data on WTD are available [3, 
37], we rely on policy variations between countries and well 
as changes in control variables between countries to explore 
the relationship between policies and WTD own and family 
members’ organs alongside changes in relevant time varying 
controls. As an important explanation for the effect of family 
consent, we include information on whether the individual 
has discussed organ donation with his/her family and two 
country-level variables—whether the respondent’s country 
of residence has presumed consent legislation and whether 
the respondent’s country of residence routinely seeks family 
consent. Our main interest is at the interaction of legislation 
and family consent to test for the presence of a ‘family veto 
effect’.
All individual specifications include a standard set of con-
trol explanations for actual organ donation and intentions 
from previous studies [3, 5, 6]. More specifically, we include 
gender, education, age, urban/rural residency, marital status, 
occupation, and whether the individual has a fixed landline 
in the household and/or a personal mobile phone to control 
for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that 
were associated with altruistic behaviours in the literature.
The empirical specification predicting the probability of 
an individual’s WTD ( yij) is reproduced below as:
where Zjt reflects country specific covariates, Xijt refers to 
individual covariates (e.g., whether the individual has dis-
cussed donation in the family), PCj stands for presumed 
consent regulation (specific to country j, and in the absence 
of legislation changes fixed over time and fixed for indi-
viduals within the same country), and FCj refers to family 
consent (again a country-level dummy which does not vary 
over time, but can vary with respect to presumed consent 
(1)
WTD
(
yij = 1,
{
Zjt,Xit, PCj, FCj
})
= Zjt훾 + Xijt훽 + PCj훾 + FCt훿 + 휀ijt,
legislation). We allow for a battery of effects and consider 
different specifications which vary the number of control 
variables as well as country and year fixed effects. The lat-
ter is our preferred specification as it controls for country-
specific variation in culture and time-specific events.
We estimate pooled fixed effects OLS and probit speci-
fications with clustered standard errors to account for cor-
relation within countries and gender. We allow for both 
country fixed effects to capture the effect of unobservables 
that are country specific as well as year fixed effects to 
control for those variables that simply correlate with time, 
namely time varying unobserved heterogeneity during the 
period examined that could have influenced our estimates. 
Hence, our estimates of the role of family vetoes are net 
of the effects of other potential time and country-specific 
effects.
We have run a number of checks to test the robustness 
of our results to different specifications, including probit 
and logit specifications. In our primary analysis, we had 
excluded respondents with ‘don’t know’ answers and robust-
ness checks were carried out to examine the sensitivity to 
such exclusions. When confronted with a decision to donate 
family members’ organs, respondents who have no formed 
opinion may be more likely to default to a negative answer. 
We, therefore, conducted a robustness check of our findings 
by recoding ‘don’t know’ answers to ‘not WTD’.
Attitudes in the population and policies could impact each 
other, which poses a major challenge to the estimation of an 
effect in any one direction. In the absence of a quasi-natural 
experiment (introduction of a new policy) in the observation 
period, we investigated the use of instrumental variables to 
address potential endogeneity. However, we could not iden-
tify a strong instrument that could credibly disentangle the 
effect of national policies on attitudes in the population from 
a potential reverse effect of attitudes on policies. Rather than 
using a weak instrument, we elected to continue with a non-
instrumented set of specifications [38].
Actual donations
For the second set of models (aggregate level), we use 
the log of cadaveric organ donation rates in all countries 
from our sample from 2001 through 2010 as our depend-
ent variable. We include actual organ donation data from 
28 countries over 10 years. There were missing donation 
rates in 2001 for Estonia, Greece, Lithuania; in 2003, for 
Luxembourg; and in 2001–2003 for Bulgaria. We include 
two sets of covariates of interest; institutional and behav-
ioural variables. The institutional variables included organ 
donation legislation and whether family consent is rou-
tinely sought. For the behavioural variable, we include a 
dummy variable for whether more than 50% of the popu-
lation in that country had discussed organ donation with 
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their family members. Data for this variable came from the 
Eurobarometer surveys. Data on organ donation discussion 
in the family were available for 15 countries before 2006, 
27 countries before 2009, and 28 countries for 2009 and 
2010. Missing data on attitudes before 2006 are due to 
countries joining the EU in the 2004 expansion not hav-
ing been included in previous waves of the Eurobarometer 
survey. Adding in missing data on actual donation rates 
leaves a sample of 210 observations for the analysis of 
the relationship between family attitudes and organ dona-
tion rates. We also estimated interaction terms between the 
behavioural and institutional variables.
Standard control variables include GDP per capita, edu-
cational attainment, whether the country is pre-dominantly 
Catholic and whether it practices common law. We also 
controlled for deceased organ donor supply by including 
the number of deaths from motor vehicle accidents and 
cerebrovascular deaths per 100,000 population. We have 
followed the analysis of Abadie and Gay [3] in using the 
log of vehicle accident/cerebrovascular deaths and inclu-
sion of a dummy for common law countries. We did not 
include health expenditure per capita as it was highly cor-
related with GDP per capita.
Log annual donation rates in each country (yjt) are spec-
ified as follows:
where Zjt are a set of country-level covariates (eg. educa-
tional attainment, GDP per capita); Fjt is the country-level 
family covariate (behavioral variable); Rj are a set of coun-
try-level, time-invariant regulatory covariates (institutional 
variables), including presumed consent legislation and 
routine family consent; and Tt are year fixed effects. Given 
that policy variables do not vary within the period of our 
study, our preferred specification is a pooled cross-section 
with both country and time effects with bootstrapped stand-
ard errors. Alternative specifications produce comparable 
results.
We first specify a set of two models to analyse the rela-
tionship between legislation and actual donation rates, 
controlling for a set of country-level covariates and includ-
ing country effects to control for cultural differences in our 
set of diverse countries. We then add the behavioural vari-
able (majority of population discussed organ donation) in a 
second set of models and interact this with organ donation 
legislation to explain differences in donation rates in our 
sample, controlling for the same set of country covariates. 
Finally, we consider the inclusion of country fixed effects 
to wipe out the effect of country invariant unobservables. 
We use bootstrapped standard errors in all models (300 
iterations).
(2)log(yjt) = Zjt훾 + Fjt훽 + Rj훿 + Tt휃 + 휀jt,
Our analysis is primarily focused on the set of (at the 
time of data collection) 28 European countries plus Turkey, 
for which we conducted regression analyses at the indi-
vidual level. We test the robustness of our findings using 
alternative samples (results provided in Table S2). We rep-
licate the results of Abadie and Gay using a sample similar 
to theirs (excluding the United States, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, for which we have no data). For this sample 
(the “Abadie and Gay sample”), we exclude from our initial 
sample Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovak Republic, and 
Turkey. We also define a “Western Christian sample” that 
follows the reasoning of Abadie and Gay [3] for excluding 
some of the countries in their sample (that are not West-
ern Christian countries). Differently to them, we keep many 
Eastern European countries in the sample, because data 
that were not available when Abadie and Gay [3] conducted 
their study have become available in the meantime. For the 
“Western Christian sample”, we exclude Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Greece, Romania, and Turkey from the full set of 28 coun-
tries. Finally, we show that our results hold even when we 
use a more restrictive sample by limiting the analysis to only 
1 year (2010, the last year for which we have data).
Results
In the pooled sample of all three Eurobarometer waves, 
we document that 67.4% were WTD their own organs and 
67.3% were WTD a family member’s organs (Table 1). 
There was some variation in attitudes over time, pointing 
towards less favourable attitudes towards organ donation in 
2009 compared to 2002, which could partly be explained by 
the accession of new EU member states in 2005. In countries 
with presumed consent, but no practice to routinely seek 
family consent, WTD decreased between 2002 and 2009 
(Figure S1). Average WTD one’s own and a relative’s organs 
was highest in the group of countries with both presumed 
consent legislation and family consent policy compared to 
other groups in 2002 and 2006, but was lower compared to 
informed consent countries in 2009.
Family consent and WTD one’s own and a relative’s 
organs
Our regression estimates predicting individuals’ donation 
intentions (WTD one’s own and a relative’s organs) show 
a positive association of presumed consent as compared 
to informed consent (Table 3). However, this relation-
ship is only true in countries where no family consent is 
required (our preferred specification shows an 15 percent-
age point (pp) increase in the WTD one’s own organs and 
18 pp increase in the WTD family members’), whilst it 
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becomes non-statistically significant when family consent 
is required. Furthermore, family discussion exerts a large 
independent association with an individual’s WTD one’s 
own and relatives’ organs (27 pp increase).
Nonetheless, as already reported, there are good reasons 
to believe that intentions to donate (WTD estimates) does 
not necessarily translate into actual organ donation behav-
iour, and more specifically, the regulatory environment 
and family consent might interfere in such an association. 
Indeed, Fig. 1a shows a positive association between the 
average WTD organs and cadaveric organ donation rates 
in countries that are subject to either informed consent or 
presumed consent and family consent. However, the asso-
ciation turns negative for countries with pure presumed 
consent policies (without family consent). The overall high 
rates of WTD in presumed consent countries are at odds 
with a pattern of consistently lower actual organ dona-
tion rates compared to countries with presumed consent 
(Table 2).
Next, Fig. 1b reveals that part of such effects is confirmed 
when one examines the association between family discus-
sions and actual donation rate. Indeed, a positive association 
is found between donation rates and family discussions in 
countries with either informed consent or presumed consent 
with family consent required. In contrast, no such positive 
association is found in countries subject to presumed con-
sent with no family consent. Figure 2 shows a time invariant 
trend that informed consent countries exhibit 20–30% lower 
organ donation rates. However, among presumed consent 
countries, those adopting a practice of routinely seeking 
family approval had higher donation rates than countries 
with pure presumed consent legislation from 2007 onwards.
Family consent and actual donation
Next, we proceed with examining the effect of legisla-
tive environment and family consent on actual donation. 
Table 4 shows the coefficients of the regression analy-
sis predicting actual donation rate. We show a significant 
effect of informed and presumed consent legislation only 
in naïve models (Table 4) where the effect of family consent 
attenuates the influence of regulatory environment. More 
specifically, the effect of regulatory environment suggests 
higher donation rates in presumed consent countries, yet, 
Table 3  Estimates for the probability of being willing to donate (WTD) ones own and their relatives organs (28 countries)
This specification refers to the probability to donate ones organs and those of relatives. Coefficients for probit specifications are marginal effects. 
Controls include: married or living together; gender; education (four categories); age group (four categories); urban residency; landline phone 
ownership; mobile phone ownership; occupation (seven categories); and a range of country-level controls: log GDP per capita; tertiary education 
attainment; Catholic country; common law country; and log motor vehicle and CV deaths
***Significant at the 1% level
**5% level. SE shown in parentheses
Variables WTD own organs WTD family member’s organs
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6)
Regulation covariates
Donation policy (reference category: informed consent)
Presumed consent, no family 
consent
0.175** (0.077) 0.153** (0.075) 0.154** (0.074) 0.206** (0.102) 0.178* (0.099) 0.179* (0.098)
Presumed and family consent 0.078 (0.055) 0.074 (0.050) 0.076 (0.051) 0.056 (0.069) 0.050 (0.064) 0.049 (0.064)
Family covariates
Organ donation discussed 0.267*** (0.010) 0.274*** (0.015) 0.241*** (0.009) 0.238*** (0.011)
Interaction regulation/family 
covariates
Interaction organ donation 
discussed × presumed consent 
(no family consent)
− 0.007 (0.029) − 0.004 (0.024)
Interaction organ donation 
discussed × presumed consent 
× family consent
− 0.012 (0.023) 0.007 (0.022)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-wave fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model statistics
Observations 49,936 49,718 49,718 49,936 49,718 49,718
Pseudo R-squared 0.087 0.156 0.156 0.073 0.127 0.127
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the presence of family consent attenuates the association 
of presumed consent by 23% in our preferred specification.
Channel: family discussion
Nonetheless, such an association is confounded by the extent 
of family discussion, which is more common when fam-
ily consent is required or in informed consent countries as 
suggested by Fig. 1b. Hence, we included in our specifica-
tion a variable capturing whether the majority in a country 
had discussed organ donation, which is then interacted with 
regulatory environments. This variable is retrieved form 
Eurobarometer surveys and is only available for the coun-
tries included in such surveys, hence, our sample is slightly 
smaller for these analyses. Table 5 reports estimates sug-
gesting that regulatory variables are statistically insignifi-
cant when controlling for family discussions. However, once 
country fixed effects (and hence potential country-specific 
unobservables) are controlled for (in the preferred model 
5.3), we observe a reduction in organ donation rates by 32 pp 
in countries where the majority had discussed organ dona-
tion in their families. However, in countries with presumed 
consent legislation and a routine policy to seek family con-
sent, this effect is reversed and we observe a 33 pp increase 
in organ donation rates for countries where the majority of 
families had discussed organ donation. These findings are 
robust across all three samples in our robustness checks, and 
are robust in terms of direction of effect and effect size when 
restricting the sample to 1 year only (Table S2).
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Fig. 1  a Relationship between average willingness to donate own 
organs and actual cadaveric donation rates per million population, 
grouped by organ donation policies (2002, 2006, 2009). Informed 
consent countries Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Nether-
lands, Romania, United Kingdom. Presumed and family consent: Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey. 
Presumed consent without family consent countries: Austria, Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Sweden. Values for 2002 
only include 15 EU member countries before 2004. b Relationship 
between proportion of the population discussing organ donation and 
actual cadaveric donation rates per million population, grouped by 
organ donation policies (2002, 2006, 2009). Informed consent coun-
tries Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, 
United Kingdom. Presumed and family consent: Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey. Presumed con-
sent without family consent countries: Austria, Czech Republic, Lat-
via, Luxembourg, Poland, Sweden. Values for 2002 only include 15 
EU member countries before 2004. Source: Data on discussion about 
organ donation come from Eurobarometer 58.2, 66.2 and 72.3 from 
2002, 2006 and 2009. Actual cadaveric donation rates come IRODaT 
[24], GODT [25]. Source: Willingness to donate organs come from 
Eurobarometer 58.2, 66.2 and 72.3 from 2002, 2006 and 2009. Actual 
cadaveric donation rates come IRODaT [24], GODT [25]
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Additional analyses
Robustness checks on individual level models
Table S1 presents the results of robustness checks run 
for the most complete model (model 3.3), showing that 
the results do not change materially when using a logit 
(instead of probit) model. When including don’t know 
answers (recoded as ‘not willing to donate’, instead of 
excluding these responses), legislation variables are sta-
tistically significant in addition to the family discussion 
variable.
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Fig. 2  Deceased organ donation rates 2001–2010 in countries without 
presumed consent; countries with presumed consent only; and coun-
tries with presumed consent and routine family consent. Informed 
consent countries Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Nether-
lands, Romania, United Kingdom. Presumed and family consent: Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey. 
Presumed consent without family consent countries: Austria, Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Sweden. Values for 2002 
only include 15 EU member countries before 2004.  Source: IRODaT 
[24], GODT [25]
Table 4  Estimates for log 
of cadaveric donation rates, 
2001–2010 (28 countries)
This table provides the estimates of regulation covariates on organ donation rates (log transformed) along-
side a number of controls, time and country fixed effects. All models include year fixed effects. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped
***Significant at the 1% level
**5% level
Variables (4.1) (4.2)
Regulation covariates
Donation policy (reference category: informed 
consent)
Presumed consent, no family consent 0.484*** (0.142) 1.536** (0.752)
Presumed and family consent 0.401*** (0.122) 1.176*** (0.361)
Controls
Log GDP per capita 0.198 (0.164) 0.681** (0.275)
Tertiary education attainment 0.003 (0.00499) − 0.001 (0.0107)
Catholic country − 0.489** (0.219) 0.280 (0.272)
Common law 0.397*** (0.0906) 0.664*** (0.181)
Log motor vehicle and CV deaths 0.005 (0.116) 1.593** (0.707)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Country effects Yes
Observations 260 260
R-squared 0.410 0.883
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Robustness checks on aggregate donation rates
We explored the effect of different subsamples (Table S2) 
and find results that are almost identical with those in 
Table 5. The only material difference found in these robust-
ness checks is that statistical significance disappears when 
restricting the analysis to only 1  year. However, effect 
direction and sizes still remains consistent with our overall 
findings.
Conclusion and policy implications
Using European data, this paper has documented that fam-
ily consent legislation plays a central role in influencing 
both organ donation intentions and actual donation rates. 
Our findings indicate that a policy to routinely seek family 
consent reduced WTD, and the effect of presumed consent 
legislation on actual donations was also reduced by 23% 
when examining family consent. These effects are robust 
and can be explained by the influence of family discussions. 
These results suggest that presumed consent by itself often 
will be inconsistent with a person’s desires, because it is 
rare that people will explicitly opt out of an organ donation 
policy, as the alternative raises ethical concerns. Hence, a 
more nuanced policy using an active or even enhanced active 
choice model, where people are asked to say one way or 
another as to whether they want to donate (yes or no) (active 
choice) and giving consequences of what they might lose 
by not opting in (enhanced active choice), might be a better 
compromise between opt in vs. out [39].
Other policy approaches that might arise from these 
findings are removing the idea of family consent particu-
larly in presumed consent environments, although this is 
unlikely to be feasible from political and societal accept-
ability perspectives. Ethically, it is a challenge to suggest 
that the wishes of bereaved relatives be ignored when their 
loved one has not ‘opted out’ in a presumed consent envi-
ronment. Wales has developed a ‘soft’ presumed consent 
approach which attempts to bridge the difficult policy sce-
nario of stating that relative consent is not sought but in 
fact, relatives are consulted about two points. First, life-
style factors about the deceased that may impact ability 
to be an organ donor and second, whether the relative has 
any evidence as to whether he/she might think that the 
deceased would not have agreed to donation [40] Alter-
natively, countries could allow individuals to document 
their preferences either way in a registry even in presumed 
consent countries as discussed in Bilgel [34].
Table 5  Estimates for log of cadaveric donation rates, 2001–2010 (28 countries)
This table provides the estimates of regulation covariates on organ donation rates (log transformed) alongside a number of controls, time and 
country fixed effects. All models include year fixed effects. Standard errors are bootstrapped
***Significant at the 1% level
**5% level
Variables (5.1) (5.2) (5.3)
Regulation covariates
Donation policy (reference category: informed consent)
Presumed consent, no family consent 0.0987 (0.117) 0.154 (0.201) 0.433 (1.245)
Presumed and family consent 0.163 (0.103) 0.134 (0.132) 0.369 (0.410)
Family covariates
Organ donation discussed by > 50% of population 0.0440 (0.0957) − 0.00840 (0.112) − 0.317** (0.159)
Interaction regulation/family covariates
Presumed consent, no family consent × majority discussed organ donation − 0.186 (0.230) 0.622 (0.591)
Presumed and family consent × majority discussed organ donation 0.194 (0.139) 0.331** (0.161)
Controls
Log GDP per capita − 0.126 (0.124) − 0.103 (0.191) 0.337 (0.548)
Tertiary education attainment − 0.00238 (0.00488) − 0.000975 (0.00477) 0.00825 (0.0125)
Catholic country 0.448*** (0.0799) 0.414*** (0.0829) 1.094** (0.542)
Common law − 0.0344 (0.134) − 0.0467 (0.112) 0.839 (1.254)
Log motor vehicle and CV deaths − 0.874*** (0.209) − 0.845*** (0.221) − 0.268 (0.427)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes
Observations 210 210 210
R-squared 0.426 0.434 0.869
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Another policy approach that has shown the potential 
for success is the priority rule model as in Singapore and 
Israel where individuals who have opted into organ dona-
tion will be placed higher on the organ recipient list should 
they need a transplant [41]. While the priority rule model 
may increase organ donation rates, one of the key criti-
cisms has been that quality of donor organs may fall as 
those who are more likely to be sick in the future may 
be more inclined to register as donors. Recent work has 
suggested a freeze mechanism such that there is a delay 
between the time someone signs up to be a donor and eligi-
bility for prioritization on the waiting list [42]. Implement-
ing such a system is complex from a public acceptability 
perspective and, therefore, presently may not replace or 
work alongside of the current paradigm of presumed and 
informed consent across many countries [43].
Our study faces some important limitations stemming 
from both the cross sectional and self-reported nature of 
our data sources. Decisions and intentions in the health 
domain are part of a dynamic process of information uptake 
and circumstances surrounding decision-making includ-
ing the nature of family ties [44, 45]. Our cross-sectional 
and self-reported data captures a single moment in time for 
respondents and countries but nonetheless provides us a 
robust depiction of that moment. Another limitation to our 
study is that organ donation desires may not be the same for 
all organs [5, 6].
Nevertheless, our study makes an important contribution 
to the literature. We have now presented evidence suggesting 
that the importance of legislative environment is moderated 
by the role of the family in vetoing donation. Routine family 
consent policies attenuate the effect of presumed consent 
legislation, and are associated with reduced willingness to 
donate a relative’s organs.
Together with attitudinal findings, this suggests the need 
to involve the family in actual donation decisions from the 
beginning to avoid vetoing behaviour, engage in active 
efforts to work with patients’ families to enhance donation 
levels and/or encourage advance directives that cannot be 
overruled by relatives.
Encouraging advance directives and living wills to settle 
any family disputes about donation and remove ambiguity 
about decision-making [26] should be a key policy instru-
ment to ensure that donation wishes (either allowing or not 
allowing) are followed. Crystallizing individuals’ wishes 
prior to death through pre-commitments would perhaps be 
even more instrumental in encouraging donation rates than 
policy alone.
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